This article looks at the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) and how they assess seven programs. It establishes that the PART does not adequately consider different program types and has characteristics that create a disconnection between this tool and the GPRA: It does not enter into dialogue with the GPRA regarding the choice of performance indicators; it evaluates programs through criteria that conflict with the programs' statutes or intent and penalizes programs for the degree of explicitness in their authorizing statutes; it uses standardized measures that sometimes overlook the intent of statutes or the discretionary nature of implementation; it employs a different level of analysis from the GPRA; it places a contradictory emphasis on the relationship between programs with similar goals; and it emphasizes different external factors influencing program performance. The article concludes with recommendations on how to improve the PART.
and now exists in some form both at the state and federal levels. It has surpassed similar previous reform efforts such as Management by Objectives, Total Quality Management, Zero-Based Budgeting, and Program Planning and Budgeting. This article looks at two manifestations of the performance management movement in the United States, namely, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), which have assumed important roles in the evaluation of agencies and programs. The analysis looks at how seven programs responded to the GPRA requirements at two points in time (one in the Clinton administration and one during the Bush administration) and to the PART requirements and shows that although the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has argued that these two tools are related, the link that exists between them is rather weak. 1 The article delineates seven points of conflict and disconnection between these performance management tools and represents a preliminary look that provides an overview of their relationship, which shows that each measurement technique has a different set of policy implications, and concludes with judgments about the utility of the PART and what options exist to improve it.
2

GPRA
In 1993, Congress passed the GPRA with broad bipartisan support. 3 The act was put into operation in 1997 and requires federal agencies to develop strategic plans, annual performance plans, and performance reports. The GPRA was one of several preceding efforts to link performance to budgeting since the 1950s. Previous efforts included the Hoover Commission; the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System developed by President Lyndon Johnson in 1965; Management by Objectives initiated by President Richard Nixon in 1973; and Zero-Based Budgeting initiated by President Jimmy Carter in 1977. However, although these were presidential initiatives, the GPRA is a congressional reform effort and is the only one that took the form of legislation (Radin, 2000, p. 115) . The passage of the GPRA reflects the public attention to management in the 1990s (Radin, 2000, p. 116 ). The legislation was also embraced by the Clinton administration and viewed as complementary to the government reinvention efforts of Gore (Radin, 2000, p. 116) .
The GPRA's purpose included creating a focus on results, quality of service, and public satisfaction; improving internal management of programs; improving congressional decision making through the provision of information on the progress toward achieving statutory goals and the effectiveness of programs; and building confidence in the government by holding agencies accountable (Radin, 2000, p. 118) . Hence, the GPRA is based on the assumptions that measurement of government performance is essential for improving it and that both congressional and executive branch oversight of federal agency performance was seriously hampered by a lack of results-oriented goals and indicators (Frederickson & Frederickson, 2006; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004a , 2004b . The performance reports are intended to be a major accountability source and to provide information to agency managers, policy makers, and the public about what agencies have achieved with the resources that were allocated to them. The reports are submitted and reviewed by the OMB, which is also responsible for issuing annual guidance for the preparation of the GPRA reports. Prior to the enactment of the GPRA, federal agencies collected performance information at the program level, but few had results-oriented performance information to manage or make strategic policy decisions for the agency as a whole (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004b).
The GPRA requires agencies to define (a) their goals and objectives (for a period of 3 to 5 years), (b) how the goals and objectives are to be achieved, (c) the key factors external to the agency and beyond its control that could significantly affect the achievement of goals and objectives, and (d) the performance measures the agency will use to evaluate its progress. GPRA reports are prepared by the agencies themselves.
PART
The President's Management Agenda (PMA) was released by the OMB in August 2001. The PMA delineated President Bush's vision for government reform, which would be guided by three main principles: Government should be citizen centered, not bureaucracy centered; it should be results oriented; and it should be market based and actively promoting innovation through competition (Office of Management and Budget, 2002) . Furthermore, the Bush administration made the integration of performance and budgets one of five government-wide priorities, of which the PART, introduced in 2002, is a central element. Hence, the purpose of the PART includes enriching budget analysis. However, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the relationship between an overall PART rating and the budget of the program is not a rigid calculation, as lower ratings do not automatically translate into less funding for a program and vice versa (Office of Management and Budget, 2004a) . 4 In addition to linking performance with budget allocations, the PART also aims to ensure that every government program identifies the outcomes it works to achieve, implements clear, quantifiable long-term and annual performance measures, and collects data on whether it is achieving results. The plan for the PART was to review about 20% of all federal programs every year so that by the 2008 budget submission, every program would have been evaluated using this tool.
The PART was designed to be a standard method for measuring the performance of all federal programs. It assesses four areas: purpose and design, strategic planning, management, and results and accountability. Section 1 aims to establish whether the programs' design and purpose are clear and defensible; the second section evaluates whether the agency sets valid annual and long-term goals for programs; the third section rates agency management of programs, including financial oversight and program improvement efforts; and the fourth section focuses on results that programs can report with accuracy and consistency.
The answers to questions in each of the four sections result in a numeric score for each section from 0 to 100 (with 100 being the best), which are then combined to achieve an overall rating that ranges from Effective to Moderately Effective to Adequate to Ineffective (see the appendix for a complete explanation of PART ratings). Programs that do not have acceptable performance measures or have not yet collected performance data usually receive a rating of Results Not Demonstrated.
The PART has seven different worksheets that reflect differences in types of programs: Direct Federal, Competitive Grant, Block/Formula Grant, Research and Development, Capital Assets and Acquisition, Credit, and Regulatory. Each type of the PART includes the basic questions that compose the Direct Federal PART and additional selected questions tailored to that program type. 5 Whereas GPRA reports are prepared by agencies, the PART assessments are carried out by OMB personnel that communicate with agency staff. Agency staff complete the PART questionnaires and include explanations and evidence of performance as well as proposed performance measures and data. After this process, OMB reviews the PARTs, and agencies are given a chance to submit appeals. The PART involves both agencies and OMB staff: Agencies contribute personnel from both the program being reviewed and from the central department offices, and OMB contributes with a program examiner as the primary contact.
The key differences between the GPRA and the PART can be found along five variables: (a) focus, (b) government branch involved in the process, (c) organizational approach, (d) requirements, and (e) approach to performance measures (see Table 1 ). Whereas the GPRA places its focus on agencies, the PART has a narrower focus as it looks just at programs. The GPRA requires the involvement of both the executive branch and Congress because agencies are required to develop and submit to Congress their strategic plans. The strategic plans are to take into consideration the views of Congress and other stakeholders. In contrast, the PART is only centered in the executive branch, namely in the OMB. The organizational approach of these two evaluation tools also differs in terms of who develops performance evaluation goals: Whereas the OMB develops performance indicators and rates programs based on them, the GPRA's performance indicators are developed by the agencies themselves. In addition, although the PART measures emphasize efficiency outcomes, the GPRA employs multiple types of measures but does highlight outcomes as well. Finally, although the PART's requirements are limited to having programs measure up to its set of standardized performance measures, the GPRA's requirements are multiple and require that agencies elaborate strategic plans, based on which they should develop a performance plan and later on a performance report. 228 The American Review of Public Administration James Q. Wilson has developed a typology of organizations based on whether their outputs (the direct products of a process) and outcomes (the valued consequences) are observable (Wilson, 1989, pp.158-159) . This typology divides organizations into one of the following four types--procedural, production, craft, and coping. Production organizations have observable outputs and outcomes; procedural organizations have observable outputs but unobservable outcomes; craft organizations have unobservable outputs but observable outcomes; and coping organizations have unobservable outputs and outcomes. This classification suggests that any program performance instrument would be facing the most challenges in assessing the performance of coping organizations because neither outputs nor outcomes would be observable and hence measurable. Several other observations can be made. Production organizations give most of their attention to outcomes that are easily measured and ignore those outcomes that are less easily observed or counted (Radin, 2006) . Procedural organizations face a situation in which there is often no result or one that occurs in the distant future, and craft organizations involve situations in which staff either produce an outcome or do not (Radin, 2006) .
Hence, although programs differ, the PART approach largely treats them alike and does not recognize congressional decisions to enact programs in different forms. For example, block grants are enacted in ways that provide discretion to states on how to use the funds. To achieve this, program goals are left along more general terms. The PART penalizes such an approach by stamping programs as having "unclear goals." Also, it is based on the assumption that programs have observable outputs and outcomes, that is, they are of the production organization type according to the Wilson typology. This is particularly salient because for the PART, the standard of proof that a program is performing is positive evidence, that is, observable and, hence, measurable outputs. In the absence of "solid evidence to support a positive answer, the answer is deemed not favorable" (Office of Management and Budget, n.d.b) . In contrast, the GPRA functions from a different perspective. Although it also places emphasis on outcome measurement, because output measures are more readily available than outcome, more output measures are initially present in the GPRA performance plans, but agencies are expected to work toward increasing the number and quality of outcome measures.
The Programs: Wilson's Categories, GPRA, and PART A brief description is provided for the programs analyzed in this article, along with their categorization according to Wilson's typology. Their PART and GPRA evaluations (two GPRA reports were analyzed for each program-one in the Clinton administration and one in the Bush administration) are provided as well (see Table 2 (Boyd, 1995 (Boyd, , 1996 . In 2005, Congress did not take a position on the president's proposal to consolidate the CDBG program into the Strengthening American Communities Initiative.
CDBG's mission, according to the HCD Act, is the "establishment and maintenance of viable urban communities by providing decent housing and a suitable living environment and expanding economic opportunities, principally for persons of low and moderate income" (Housing and Community Development Act, 1974) . CDBG seeks to meet three national objectives: (a) to benefit low-and moderate-income persons, (b) to aid in the prevention and elimination of slums and blights, and (c) to meet an urgent community development need that threatens the health and safety of residents of the community (Boyd, 1995, p. 3) . The CDBG program provides annual grants on a formula basis to 1,180 general units of local government and states.
CDBG is a procedural program. Its mission is the development of viable communities, but what "viable" means for each community is left at their discretion and is also quite subjective. The broad mission and objectives may also indicate that the framers 230 The American Review of Public Administration could not or did not want to provide a concrete definition of community development, as it consists of a number of components--health, employment, housing, infrastructure development-from which grantees may choose the ones that best represent the community development process.
The indicators it has used to measure its performance have been output indicators, which are observable and act as proxies for the outcome of "viable communities," which is difficult to define and capture in a measurement because it varies from community to community and takes a long time to materialize. The program's GPRA 2000 and 2005 reports use output indicators such as jobs created through Section 108 loans and CDBG, share of CDBG entitlement funds that benefit low-and moderate-income residents, share of state CDBG funds that benefit low-and moderate-income persons, and share of direct beneficiaries of CDBG activities. Furthermore, HUD's Performance and Accountability Reports explicitly state that it faces limitations in the extent to which it can measure outcomes due to statutory provisions, potential reporting burdens, and privacy concerns, with CDBG being a prime example (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2002).
The PART and the GPRA assessments of the program are conflicting (see Table 2 ). The PART 2003 assessment judged the CDBG program to be Ineffective (Office of Management and Budget, n.d.a). The program was deemed to have no clear definition of its goals. Furthermore, its objectives were not operationalized in its performance measures. It also found that CDBG might be duplicating the efforts of other smaller grants programs. The PART also criticized the program for having ineffective targeting, for lack of specific annual and long-term goals, for lack of control over grantee performance, and for poor management of performance information. 6 The PART judged that the annual performance goalsthe number of jobs created and the share of low-or moderate-income persons helped by CDBG funds-do not relate well with grantee performance. Hence, OMB advised HUD to adopt more relevant annual outcome measures.
On the other hand, both GPRA reports (for 2000 and 2005) found CDBG to have met or exceeded half or all of its goals (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2000; Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2005, p. 117). For 2000, CDBG did not meet its goal to create or retain 276,000 jobs through Section 108 loans and CDBG, as just 150,260 jobs were created or retained. It also did not meet-but by a very small margin-its goal to have the share of state CDBG funds that benefit low-and moderate-income persons remain at 98% (it was at 97.4%). However, CDBG did meet and in fact exceeded the goal of having the share of CDBG entitlement funds that benefit low-and moderate-income residents remain at 92% (it was actually at 93.7%) and having the share of direct beneficiaries of CDBG activities remains at 56% (it was at 62.7%). For 2005, CDBG exceeded all of its goals: It created 91,300 jobs (the goal was 76,432), and 95.3% of CDBG funds benefited low-or moderate-income persons (the goal was to have the share of CDBG entitlement funds that benefited low-and moderate-income persons remain or exceed 92%).
Water Pollution Control Grants Program. Public awareness for controlling water pollution in the United States led to enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, which were amended in 1977 and became known as the Clean Water Act (CWA). Section 106 of the CWA authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to provide federal assistance to states (including territories, the District of Columbia, and Indian tribes) and interstate agencies "to assist them in administering programs for the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution, including enforcement directly or through appropriate State law enforcement officers or agencies" (Clean Water Act, 1977, p. 9) .
Section 106 grants are the only source of annual base funding the EPA provides for all 50 states for water quality programs to assist them in developing, planning, and administering programs for the prevention, reduction, and elimination of water pollution (Office of Management and Budget, n.d.a). These grants are the primary source of federal funds for the implementation of components of the state water quality programs. Also, Section 106 work plans give EPA a mechanism for ensuring that no duplication or redundancy of effort occurs.
EPA's Water Pollution Control Grants Program falls in the production category because both outputs (number of standards developed, permits traded, or fines levied) and outcomes (measurable water quality changes over time as a result of those outputs) are observable. These attributes make it possible to systematically evaluate the Water Pollution Control Grants Program's goals and performance (efficiency and effectiveness), and enable Congress to monitor the agency's progress toward achieving these goals over time.
The PART and the GPRA assessments for the Water Pollution Control Grants Program are similar (see Table 2 ). The PART assessment found the program to be Adequate (Office of Management and Budget, n.d.a). It was mostly criticized for not being effectively targeted because of the allotment formula it uses, for the fact that states' work plans do not directly link their proposed activities to EPA's Strategic Plan or annual performance measures, and for having budget requests that do not demonstrate how funding, policy, or legislative decisions may affect performance or provide evidence that the requested funding will enable the program to achieve its performance goals. According to its GPRA 2001 assessment, the program met 5 of its 8 performance goals. The 2003 GPRA report shows the program had 11 goals, of which it met 5, did not meet 1, and had a data lag for 5 of its goals. Hence, both of the GPRA reports show the program has satisfactory performance, having met half or more of its goals.
COPS. In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which represented a significant engagement of the federal government in local law enforcement and crime problems. Title I, "Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act" sought to "substantially increase the number of law enforcement officers interacting directly with members of the community" and to "provide additional and more effective training to law enforcement officers to enhance their problem solving, service, and other skills needed in interacting with members of the community" as well as to encourage the development and implementation of innovative programs and encourage the development of new technologies to assist law enforcement agencies in reorienting the emphasis of their activities from reacting to crime to preventing crime (Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 1994). The act led to the establishment of COPS. COPS provides two broad categories of services: the allocation and management of federal grants directly to local law enforcement and the provision of local law enforcement with training and other guidance around community policing strategies.
The authorizing legislation for COPS specifies that its goal is to increase the number of officers on the street and encourage a community policing philosophy. With such a goal, COPS falls in between a production and a coping type. Increasing the number of officers is easy to operationalize and measure, and the history around the authorizing legislation makes it clear that the goal of the program was to put 100,000 new officers on the street, which deems it as a production type. However, the second goal places COPS in the coping category because it is difficult to define and consequently measure what community policing is, as there is disagreement about what it constitutes in the academic and policy literature.
The GPRA reports for COPS show both supporting and refuting evidence of the PART's assessment (see Table 2 ). The PART 2002 evaluation of COPS is Results Not Demonstrated. COPS was mainly criticized for failing to develop adequate long-term goals, not coordinating with other agencies, and having little linkage between budget requests and performance (Office of Management and Budget, n.d.a). As evidenced by its GPRA 1999 report, the program did not achieve its two performance goals of preparing 12,000 grantee informational packages (it produced only 500) and of having 13,842 agencies receiving COPS grants ( 
Compliance and Enforcement Program of the FEC.
In 1975, Congress created the FEC to administer and enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), which governs the financing of federal elections. The FEC's purpose, according to FECA, is "to administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to the Act" (Federal Election Campaign Act, 1975, p. 38) . Hence, the FEC discloses campaign finance information; enforces the provisions of the law, such as the limits and prohibitions on contributions; and oversees the public funding of presidential elections through its three main programs: disclosure, compliance, and public financing. These programs do not have missions of their own but goals that help the FEC achieve its overall mission. The goal of the compliance program is to foster voluntary compliance with the disclosure and limitations provisions of the FECA through enforcement of the act in a timely, consistent, and comprehensive way (Federal Election Commission, 2005) . Considering Wilson's typology, FEC's Compliance and Enforcement Program falls in between the procedural and production organizational category. The desired outcomes for the compliance program are the perception by the regulated community that disclosure reports must be filed accurately and timely and that the FECA is enforced impartially and timely (Federal Election Commission 2005, p. 20) . Although perception by the regulated community and impartial enforcement are difficult to measure due to their subjective character, timely enforcement can be measured because the FEC's program sets a deadline that it needs to meet for issuance of advisory opinions and filing litigation pleadings. The outputs-audits, referrals for enforcement action, meeting deadlines, and cases closed-can be observed and measured. Hence, with measurable outputs and outcomes that are partially observable and unobservable, there is overlap in the organization type, and the FEC falls in between a procedural and a production organization.
The GPRA Table 2 ). The PART's major criticisms are the program's lack of long-term performance measures and targets, lack of independent evaluations, and lack of strong financial practices. 7 The program was also judged to have flaws in its decision-making process, which can result in a 3-3 impasse between the bipartisan commissioners and hence limit enforcement. In contrast, both GPRA reports show the program achieved all of its objectives (Federal Election Commission, 2003 , 2005 . In 2002, the outcome of interest for the agency was "[t]he perception by the regulated community that disclosure reports must be accurately and timely filed; that there are real consequences for non-compliance with the FECA; and that the FEC will impartially and speedily enforce the FECA" (Federal Election Commission, 2003, p. 8) . FEC's accomplishments were the establishment of programs to speed up and streamline enforcement of the filing requirements, to negotiate and settle some enforcement cases without resorting to the full enforcement process, and to implement the Case Management System; furthermore, more enforcement cases were activated, the ratio of active to inactive cases was improved, more cases were closed with substantive action, and more audits were conducted. Similarly, in 2005, FEC's Compliance and Enforcement Program met all 3 of its goals.
TVA's Power Program.
TVA is an independent federal agency, founded in 1933 with the TVA Act, to develop power resources and alleviate the economic depression of the Tennessee Valley region. TVA is the nation's largest public power company, which provides power to nearly 8.5 million residents of the Tennessee Valley. The TVA was created "for the purpose of maintaining and operating the properties now owned by the United States in the vicinity of Muscle Shoals, Alabama, in the interest of the national defense and for agricultural and industrial development, and to improve navigation in the Tennessee River and to control the destructive flood water in the Tennessee River and Mississippi River Basins" (Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 1933, p. 1). Its mission, as described in the 2006 GPRA annual report, is to provide reliable, low-cost power for the residents and businesses in the Tennessee Valley; to manage the Tennessee River system to realize regional benefits for navigation, flood damage reduction, power production, water supply, water quality, recreation, and land use; to work within existing community infrastructure to help facilitate the efficient and effective utilization of resources to support economic gain for the valley population; and to support technology innovation activities that enable the other three components of TVA's mission to be carried out more effectively and efficiently (Tennessee Valley Authority GPRA Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Year 2006 . The current goals of this program are the result of goal shifts throughout its history.
TVA's Power Program can be classified as being in the production category-with both outputs and outcomes being observable-because producing and providing public utilities are measurable events.
The PART assessment of TVA shows the agency in a slightly more positive light compared to what the GPRA performance data show (see Table 2 ). The PART assessment found TVA to be Moderately Effective (Office of Management and Budget, n.d.a). It found that the program needs to reduce its debt and is also facing high production costs compared with other power companies. Furthermore, the PART argued that by the time the program was evaluated, it did not have a business plan and a strategic plan that explained how TVA will operate in the future. The GPRA reports show the program achieved about 60% of its performance indicators for the respective years. HCFAC. The Social Security Act, Section 1128C(a), as established by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 created the HCFAC, under the joint direction of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), acting through the department's Office of Inspector General (HHS/OIG), which is "to coordinate Federal, State, and local law enforcement programs to control fraud and abuse with respect to health plans," "to conduct investigations, audits, evaluations, and inspections relating to the delivery of and payment for health care in the United States," "to provide for the modification and establishment of safe harbors and to issue advisory opinions and special fraud alerts," and "to provide for the reporting and disclosure of certain final adverse actions against health care providers, suppliers, or practitioners" among other duties (Social Security Act, Sec. 1128C(a), 1996; Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Justice Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program, 2006).
The HCFAC fits in the procedural category because outputs but not outcomes can be observed as a result of the activities of the program. Its output indicators-returns on investment (i.e., expected recoveries of funds due to successful prosecutions in the court and outof-court settlements and savings from funds not expended due to audits), expected recoveries (i.e., court and administratively assessed fines, penalties, restitutions, and other expected monetary recoveries), and number of accepted quality and management improvement recommendations-are measurable proxies for the goal of decreasing health care fraud, which according to the PART and the GPRA reports, OIG has difficulty in measuring.
The GPRA and the PART assessments of HCFAC conflict (see Table 2 ). The PART 2002 assessment gave a Results Not Demonstrated rating to HCFAC (Office of Management and Budget, n.d.a). It criticized the program for having demonstrated anecdotal success in reducing fraud, waste, and abuse and for having performance goals that do not meet the PART standards for long-term performance goals: They are not set against a baseline, and although OIG believes that a fraud estimate cannot be prospective, the PART says that many industry experts agree with this, but other entities (such as the GAO) believe it is possible to develop an estimate of health care fraud. The GPRA 1999 report shows that 6 out of 8 performance goals were reached by the program (Department of Health and Human Services, 2000 Services, 2004. pp. V-198-200) .
Medicare can be categorized both as a production and a procedural program. It is a production program because both outputs (processing of claims for reimbursement purposes) and outcomes (noticeable changes as a result of those outputs) are observable. Previous studies have indicated that managers within a production type agency may invest a tremendous amount of time toward outcomes that are considered easier to measure while forgoing measures that are unobservable (Wilson, 1989) . This may be the case for some performance goals within the Medicare program because it receives a tremendous amount of money, and there are major concerns among congressional leaders and policy analysts about the rising cost of health care as well as the growth of the Medicare program. These concerns may prompt Medicare officials to skim performance data and highlight areas in which they are overachieving to justify budget requests and allocations. However, the program can also be categorized as procedural because of the high degree of discretionary decision making that doctors have.
In the case of Medicare, the PART and the GPRA performance appraisals are similar (see Table 2 ). The PART assessment found Medicare to be Moderately Effective (Office of Management and Budget, n.d.a). Among the criticisms of the PART were that the program needed to be updated and that new legislation is needed to remove statutory constraints. These statutory constraints also make it hard for Medicare to hold key partners accountable, which is another PART criticism. The GPRA reports for Medicare show the program has been achieving half or most of its goals. Medicare had 24 GPRA performance goals, out of which 19 were achieved and 5 were not (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2004) . In 2003, out of 23 goals, the program met 13, had 3 partially met, did not meet 1, and had no performance data on 6 (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2004) .
Implications
From the above analysis of the programs according to Wilson's types, several conclusions can be drawn. First, programs vary in their nature-three of the programs fall in between two categories (COPS, FEC's Compliance and Enforcement Program, and Medicare), two programs can be categorized as production, and the remaining two are procedural. Second, this variation is reflective of the fact that although some programs have outcomes that are observable and measurable, this is not so for other programs. Yet, the PART assumes that programs are of the production type according to Wilson's typology and that they have observable outputs and outcomes. This assumption is particularly salient considering that for the PART, the standard of proof that a program is performing is positive evidence, that is, observable and measurable outputs. In the absence of "solid evidence to support a positive answer, the answer is deemed not favorable" (Office of Management and Budget, n.d.b) . Hence, to an extent, this assumption limits the applicability of the PART to evaluate programs because it disregards that certain programs have unobservable outputs and/or outcomes.
A vivid example of the limitations of the PART due to this assumption concerns its criticism of the HCFAC-a procedural program with observable outputs but not observable outcomes. The program is assessed to have Results Not Demonstrated because its existing long-term goals (return on investment, expected recoveries, and program savings) do not meet the standards for long-term performance goals for the PART because they are not set against a baseline (e.g., expected recoveries out of total possible recoveries). OIG has objected to the development of a fraud rate (or other baselines) because estimates cannot be prospective because actual fraud occurs only when it has been legally adjudicated, and large resources would have to be expended to pursue every potentially fraudulent item. The PART then cites that the GAO disagrees with OIG and that a baseline could be the amount collected of expected recoveries for a certain period. OIG has objected to the measurement of actual recoveries because collections are not in their control.
Third, there is a high degree of variation between how the PART judges programs to be performing and how the GPRA reflects their activities (see Table 2 ). The assessments range from conflicting (CDBG, FEC's Compliance and Enforcement Program, and HCFAC) to supplying both supportive and refuting evidence of program performance (COPS) to the PART providing a more positive evaluation than the GPRA reports (TVA Power Program) to being similar (Water Pollution Control Grants Program and Medicare). These results are not surprising. As the next section will show, they are the manifestation of the conflict and disconnections that exist between these two performance tools due to their use of different criteria.
Points of Conflict and Disconnection Between the GPRA and the PART
The OMB has explained that the GPRA is to provide a framework for agencies to prepare strategic plans, performance plans, and performance reports that set goals and report on the extent to which they are achieved. In turn, the PART is intended to be a systematic method of assessing performance of program activities, focusing on their contribution to an agency's achievement of its strategic plan and program performance goals. This suggests that at least theoretically, the PART is the tool that evaluates whether a program is pursuing the goals it set forth for itself in the GPRA. However, the OMB took steps that placed an increased emphasis on the PART assessment at the expense of the GPRA, which could be explained by the fact that the PART is an initiative of the Bush administration and hence warranted more attention from the OMB during his time in office. OMB's Circular A-11 of 2004 guidance requires agencies to submit a performance budget for fiscal year (FY) 2005, which should replace the annual GPRA performance plan (Office of Management and Budget, 2004b ). OMB's movement from the GPRA to the PART is also evidenced in the FY 2005 PART guidance, which states that although existing GPRA performance goals may be a starting point during the development of the PART performance goals, the GPRA goals in agency GPRA documents are to be revised significantly to reflect OMB's instructions for developing the PART performance goals (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004a). Furthermore, this guidance also states that GPRA plans should be revised to include any new performance measures used in the PART and unnecessary measures should be deleted from the GPRA plans. Also, there is lack of clarity on whether the results of the PART reviews, such as changes in program performance measures, will complement and be integrated with the long-term and strategic focus of the GPRA (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004b). In practice, however, there are substantial limitations in the degree to which the PART actually assesses performance strategies and goals in the GPRA. These limitations are described below as the seven points of conflict and disconnection between the GPRA and the PART.
Both the GPRA and the PART Emphasize Outcome Measures but Do Not Enter Into Dialogue About the Measures Used to Evaluate Programs
In some instances, there is overlap, though partial, among the program performance criteria used in the GPRA and those used in the PART. For instance, the PART analysis of the FEC's Compliance and Enforcement Program lists four program performance indicators (percentage of closed cases with substantive action, increase in total civil penalties assessed, decrease in elapsed time that it takes to close cases, and percentage of enforcement cases in active status), of which three are identical to those in its GPRA 2005 report (meet deadlines for issuance of advisory opinions and filing litigation pleadings, maintain an average active enforcement caseload in excess of 50% of total caseload, and close more than 50% of enforcement cases with substantive action). 8 This type of harmonization helps in defining a closer relationship between the program performance assessment provided by the PART and the agency assessment provided by the GPRA.
However, such harmonization is not always the case. The Medicare program had 24 indicators in its GPRA 2000 report, 23 indicators used in its GPRA 2003 report and 9 indicators used in its PART evaluation. Out of all these, just 3 overlap among all three performance evaluations. The HCFAC and CDBG have just 1 indicator that overlaps in their GPRA reports and the PART evaluations. In turn, TVA and COPS had a partial overlap between the PART and performance indicators used in some previous GPRA reports, whereas the Water Pollution Control Grants Program had a PART assessment that did not have overlapping performance indicators with any of the analyzed GPRA reports.
OMB has argued that the PART "strengthens and reinforces performance measurement under the GPRA by encouraging careful development of performance measures according to the outcome-oriented standards of the law and by requiring that agency goals be appropriately ambitious" and that "performance measures included in GPRA plans and reports and those developed or revised through the PART process must be consistent" (Office of Management and Budget, 2005a, p. 3) . Considering that the PART's assessment of three of the analyzed program evaluations did not take into consideration any of the previously available GPRA-reported performance indicators, the intended link between the GPRA and the PART is obviously disconnected in this case. These initiatives are hence complementary by purpose but not by design because the performance measures they use may not overlap at all in some cases. Furthermore, evaluations based on different criteria are almost bound to yield different performance reports and hence have limited value in assessing the effectiveness of programs. However, if evaluations based on the same criteria yield different assessments, then the program might be facing problems in achieving results.
The GPRA and the PART Can Present Very Conflicting Information on Program Performance
As demonstrated above, there is a high degree of variation between how the PART judges programs to be performing and how the GPRA evaluates their activities (see Table 2 ). Furthermore, programs that meet a similar percentage of their GPRA performance goals receive different PART ratings, which challenges the degree to which a standardized tool provides comparable information. For example, the GPRA reports of the CDBG and Medicare show that these two programs met or exceeded half of their goals. However, the PART rates CDBG as Ineffective and Medicare as Moderately Effective. These are discrepancies arising from a systemic flaw-the lack of harmonization in the performance indicators the GPRA and the PART use.
The PART Evaluates Programs Through Criteria That Conflict With or Fall Outside the Realm of the Programs' Statutes or Intent
The PART assessment of CDBG states that it does not have a clear purpose and unambiguous mission, as both the definition of "community development" and the role CDBG plays in that field are not well defined. The program's main objective is "the development of viable urban communities," and the statute purposively did not provide a narrow definition of a "viable urban community" because it was developed as part of the movement to restructure national urban aid programs and give states and localities greater flexibility to define what a viable urban community is for them and to implement community priorities (Liebschutz, 1990, p. 90) . Moreover, in 1981, Congress specifically modified the HCD Act to reduce HUD's role from making qualitative assessments of its grantee programs to only ensuring that grantees comply with the statute (Office of Management and Budget, 2005b) . Hence, the authorized uses of block grants were multiple and broadly stated, as the statute did not mandate a single most desirable use (Office of Management and Budget, 2005b) . This suggests that in the case of CDBG, its evaluation in terms of whether it has a narrow definition of what its purpose is does not match with the programs' statutory intent-to keep the language broad and allow states to develop their own definitions. In contrast, the GPRA does not have components that would place a program's evaluation in conflict with its authorizing statute.
Also, the PART's criticism of HCFAC's goals as needing to be set against a baseline (such as collections) that is not within the scope of authority of the program demonstrates a propensity toward evaluation criteria that are outside the control of the program.
The PART also criticized FEC's decision-making process, stating it can lead to an impasse. Again, this decision-making process is statutorily imposed on the FEC and is meant to achieve a goal different from efficiency-namely a mechanism for restricting partisanship in the decisions of the commission. The PART's criticism is not new (Project FEC Task Force, 2002) . The FEC recognizes this happens, but argues that the incidence of the event is overestimated: Of the 4,972 votes on enforcement cases by the commission between FY 1995 and FY 2003, only 45 (less than 1%) resulted in tie votes, and of these, in 14 votes, the ties did not go down party lines (Weintraub, 2004) .
The PART "Awards" Some Programs and Penalizes Others for the Degree of Explicitness in Their Authorizing Statutes
The PART's assessment found EPA's purpose to be clear because Congress explicitly pointed out that states, because of their proximity to environmental problems and the regulated community, were the primary implementers of the act and better able to ensure the restoration and protection of water quality services. In the case of CDBG, the program was penalized in its assessment because "viable urban communities" was not narrowly defined, which, as discussed above, was actually the congressional intent. These two examples show that the PART is oblivious to the historical setting that led to the origination of statutes and the congressional intent behind them, which should also be considered when assessing the programs.
Level of Analysis
The GPRA asks agencies to develop comprehensive mission statements and establish general goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and objectives, for the major functions and operations of the agency as well as to provide a description of the program evaluations used in establishing or revising general goals and objectives, with a schedule for future program evaluations. In contrast, the PART looks only at the program level: program purpose and design; program performance measurement, evaluations, and strategic planning; program management; and program results. Hence by default, the GPRA provides information about the overall agency performance in managing its programs, which is a macro-level perspective compared to what the PART deals with. Furthermore, there have been GPRA reports that have been organized around reporting the goals and activities of specific offices rather than programs (e.g., FEC's first GPRA report). In such cases, there is little dialogue between GPRA and the PART. This difference in levels of analysis has been established in previous work (Radin, 2006) .
The PART Places Contradictory Emphasis on the Relationship Between Programs That Share Similar Goals and Objectives
The existence of related programs can be a source of both penalties and positive evaluations. On one hand, the PART asks if programs are not redundant or duplicative of other federal, state, local, or private efforts (question 1.4 in PART 2002; Office of Management and Budget, n.d.a). If they are duplicative, then programs are penalized. On the other hand, the PART asks if programs collaborate and coordinate effectively with "related programs" that share similar goals and objectives (question 2.4 in PART 2002; Office of Management and Budget, n.d.a). If such coordination exists, programs are rated positively. First, assessing whether programs are duplicative or just related is rather subjective, for which the PART has often been criticized. Second, which programs are to be singled out as duplicative of others-the ones that emerged after a similar program or the ones with smaller budgets? For example, the PART assessment argues that CDBG is redundant with other programs because it is rarely the only source of federal funds to a community. However, this criticism does not take into consideration that CDBG is the largest source of community development aid in the federal government, which raises the question, which program is actually redundant? Perhaps the smaller programs are redundant. Section 3 of the GPRA asks agencies to identify key external factors-without specifying of what nature these might be-to the agency and beyond its control that could significantly affect the achievement of goals and objectives. In turn, the PART asks only how the impact of partner performance might affect the program: (a) Do all the partners commit and work toward the annual and/or long-term goals of the program (Section 2)? and (b) Are program managers held accountable for cost, schedule, and performance results (Section 3)? Such a narrow emphasis has two main consequences: First, it presumes that partner performance is the main external factor influencing program performance, and second, it presumes that it is controllable by the program's management, which, as will be discussed below, is not the case. This stance contrasts with the GPRA's, which takes into consideration that there is a plethora of factors impacting performance, some of which are beyond an agency's or a program's control.
The performance of partners is crucial to the functioning of most government programs. OIG's 1999 GPRA states that one of its performance indicators-Returns on Investment-is highly dependent on the success of their partners: the U.S. Attorney's Office and other components of the Department of Justice; state authorities, Congress, and HHS Operating and Staff divisions; and others to prosecute criminal cases successfully, arrive at civil settlements, enact necessary legislation, recover misspent funds, or implement recommendations for program improvements (Department of Health and Human Services, 2000) . It also emphasizes that these are functions "beyond the OIG's control, and without which our efforts would be unable to bear fruit" (Department of Health and Human Services, 2000, p. 9) .
Similarly, TVA's 2000 GPRA report also pinpoints the importance of partners in achieving performance success. It states that TVA was not able to reach its target of a decrease in the delivered cost of power because of an independent power marketer that failed to deliver power to TVA in accordance with its contract (Tennessee Valley Authority, 2001 ). However, the GPRA report also emphasizes other factors that impact performance and that are beyond its control, such as (a) the growth in the regional economy and its impact on electricity demand; (b) the changes in the cost of fuel used to generate electricity; (c) the changes in laws and regulations, particularly those related to environmental compliance, reliability, and security; (d) technological changes; and (d) changes in market interest rates.
Other programs such as Medicare are also dependent on factors beyond their control. Medicare serves an older population that will have high levels of utilization of the program. Although one goal of the program is to improve their health status, realistically, this goal will ultimately be based on medical advancements through technology and research and development. Normative arguments are presented that agencies should identify and eliminate independent variables that are beyond their control (Gormley & Weimer, 1999) . However, in the case of the Medicare program, it is practically impossible to eliminate these variables because they are by-products of the mission of the program. The effects of these external factors are accounted for in the GPRA performance measurements of the program but not in the PART.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The points of conflict and disconnection between the GPRA and the PART described above have political and managerial implications. The managerial implications include having the two program evaluation methods yield dissimilar results, in which case the effectiveness of a certain program as well as what needs to change in its organization and service delivery would be unclear. The political implications of conflicting or inefficient performance data collection and evaluation include faulty funding decisions and even erroneous decisions about whether to foster or discontinue a program.
Considering the points of conflict and disconnection between the GPRA and the PART, what are the options and what needs to be done? If the PART is left as it is, it has very limited value and questionable reliability. The PART's assumptions about the ability of programs to produce and measure outputs and outcomes are not sufficiently informed. In addition, its assumptions regarding the factors that impact programs and the variables over which programs have control are also problematic. In short, the PART needs to have a more clear relationship with the realities of federalism, constitutional intent (and the fact that agencies and the programs they implement might be the offspring of political compromises), and public service delivery.
However, this is not the only step that needs to be taken. If the PART is to continue to be used as an evaluation tool, subsequent to its revision and harmonization with the realities of federalism, constitutional intent, and public service delivery, OMB needs to make the relationship between the PART and the GPRA clearer and more useful for the evaluation of program performance. Behn (2003) has argued that the purpose for which a measure is to be put should determine its selection. If the PART is to be truly an independent (i.e., agency-and program-external) assessment, then for it to provide a valid assessment of the degree to which a program performs, it needs to use the same indicators the program does. As seen in the analysis above, this is not always the case, and in some instances, there is no overlap at all between the indicators used in GPRA reports and those in the PART assessment. Such occurrences might be explained by the fact that the levels of analysis of these two tools are different and that the process and people involved in the preparation of GPRA and PART reports differ. At this juncture, however, the utility of the PART as a complementary tool to the GPRA is quite limited.
